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Abstract The West Bank and the Gaza Strip came under Israeli occupation in
1967. Both territories had been under constant Israeli control since then, until Israel
decided to withdraw its land forces and settlements from the Strip in 2005. Whereas
the occupied status of the West Bank still remains uncontested, the status of Gaza
after the disengagement is less clear. This article addresses the question whether the
Gaza Strip can still be considered to be occupied after the 2005 disengagement. In
order to formulate an answer to this question, the article will first outline the
different elements needed to trigger occupation. It will then show that, even though
the majority argues that the Gaza Strip is still occupied, the effective control test at
the core of the law of occupation is no longer met and hence Gaza is no longer
occupied. Given that Israel nevertheless continues to exercise some degree of
control over Gaza and its population, the absence of occupation does not mean the
absence of accountability. This responsibility is however not founded on the law of
occupation but on general international humanitarian law, potentially comple-
mented by international human rights law.
Keywords Occupation  Effective control  Gaza Strip  Israel-Palestine conflict 
International humanitarian law  Post-occupation law  International human rights
law
1 Introduction
Occupation is somewhat of a strange animal in the realm of armed conflicts. It is an
atypical situation, positioned somewhere between peace and war, to which different
specific obligations apply. The characteristic distortion between effective territorial
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control and sovereign title generated by such situations requires rules regulating the
administration of the occupied territory. Furthermore, given that occupation
generates a situation in which the population is in the hands of the enemy party,
occupied populations also deserve specific protection.1 Determining whether a
situation is indeed one of occupation or not is thus decisive in assessing what
obligations are applicable to the parties concerned. The obligations of an occupying
power vis-a`-vis the occupied territory and population are far more rigorous than
those imposed upon a simple ‘invader’. To give an example, whereas an enemy
army merely has the obligation to allow the free passage of humanitarian relief for
civilians in need (see customary international humanitarian rule 55), an occupying
power would have the duty of ensuring food and medical supplies for the population
to the fullest extent possible (see Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the
protection of civilians). Determining whether a situation is one of occupation or not
is thus not without consequences on the level of protection offered to the civilians
concerned. This is precisely why the debate on the occupation of Gaza is so heated.
TheWest Bank andGaza came under Israeli occupation in 1967.Whereas it is clear
that theWest Bank continues to be occupied, the situation in theGaza Strip is different.
Indeed, in 2004, Israel decided to disengage its forces and remove the settlements from
the Strip. It claimed that upon completion of this disengagement process, there would
no longer be any grounds for claiming that the Gaza Strip continues to be occupied
territory. The majority however disagree with the position adopted by Israel.
Ultimately, the question of the status of Gaza revolves around the question whether
Israel still exercises the effective control needed to trigger the lawof occupation or not.
The ambit of this paper is to demonstrate that contrary to what most have argued,
this is no longer the case. In order to substantiate this argument, I will first of all
outline the definition of occupation and the different elements necessary for
effective control to be asserted. I will then apply these criteria to the situation in
Gaza and demonstrate that even though Israel continues to exercise an important
level of control over the Strip, this control falls short of effective control as required
under the law of occupation. Finally, I will assert that Israel however continues to
have important responsibilities vis-a`-vis Gaza and its population on the basis of
general obligations under international humanitarian law potentially complemented
by its obligations under international human rights law.
2 The Definition of Occupation
According to their common Article 2, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, next to
applying to international armed conflict in general, ‘shall also apply to all cases of
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party’.2 Being a
1 See Art. 4 of Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
12 August 1949 (hereafter GCIV).
2 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949; Geneva
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949; GCIV.
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type of international armed conflict, occupation is regulated by the laws of war, and
more specifically by the 1907 Hague Regulations,3 the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949 (GCIV) and some provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.4 On the
basis of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, ‘territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’. Given that no other
definitions have been provided in subsequently adopted treaties on the subject, this
definition remains the standard for determining the existence of a situation of
occupation.5 Importantly, Article 42 of the Hague Regulations further states that
‘the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised’. Consequently, occupation pertains only to those
areas in which the needed control has been effectively established. The possibility
of partial occupation has been further confirmed in Article 2 GCIV which
established that the rules regulating occupation contained therein apply to ‘all cases
of partial or total occupation [emphasis added]’.
In order to determine in practice whether the definition of occupation is met,
different elements need to be considered. First, it is important to highlight that the
assessment is a factual one. Second, a further assessment of what is exactly required
for the effective control test contained in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations to be
met should be made. Third, the question whether boots on the ground are
necessarily required to trigger occupation should also be discussed. Finally, it is not
only important to look at when the law of occupation is triggered but also at what is
exactly required for a situation of occupation to come to an end.
2.1 Occupation is a Question of Fact
The first important point to be noted in relation to the above-stated definition is that
it clearly established that the assessment of a situation qualifying as occupation is a
question of fact. This is even more apparent in the French and authentic version of
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations: ‘Un territoire est conside´re´ comme occupe´
lorsqu’il se trouve place´ de fait sous l’autorite´ de l’arme´e ennemie [emphasis
added]’. This has important consequences in practice. First, the qualification of the
situation by the parties concerned is of no relevance and hence does not have any
3 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (hereafter Hague
Regulations).
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
5 This has been confirmed by case law, see International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 126, para. 78; ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 172 (hereafter
Armed Activities case) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic´ and Vinko Martinovic´, Case No. IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003, paras.
215–216 (hereafter Naletilic´ case); as well as by state practice, see UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual
of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004), para. 11.2 (hereafter UK Military
Manual); US Land Warfare Field Manual (July 1956), Washington DC, 15 July 1976, para. 351 (hereafter
US Military Manual). For a more complete list of manuals confirming the importance of Art. 42 HR for
the assessment of occupation see Ferraro (2012), p. 138.
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consequences for the legal determination of the situation.6 Second, since it is purely
a factual matter; no formal declaration is needed for a situation of occupation to
come into existence. Consequently, even if the power concerned would deny the
existence of such a situation, if the facts say otherwise, the situation will be qualified
as occupation. This is far from being a hypothetical situation given the fact that
being an occupier is considered to be highly ostracized and most occupying powers
have tried to negate an occupation status in order to avoid the negative connotation
it seems to imply.7 Similarly, a mere proclamation of the existence of a situation of
occupation is also insufficient to trigger the law of occupation given that there also
needs to be occupation in fact.8
2.2 The Effective Control Test Contained in Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations
For occupation to be factually established, the effective control test contained in
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations needs to be met. Occupation creates a special
situation in which effective territorial control is in the hands of the occupying
power, while the sovereign title remains in the hands of the legitimate power,
whereas these two elements are normally both in the hands of the latter.9 The
effective control test helps to determine whether this passage of (temporary)
authority has in fact occurred. This is crucial given that the occupant needs to be
able to exercise the rights and duties normally incumbent upon the legitimate power
but momentarily suspended by the fact of occupation.10 Keeping this in mind, two
main conditions need to be fulfilled for the effective control test to be met: first, the
occupying power needs to have rendered the incumbent government incapable of
publicly exercising its authority in the area; and, second, the occupying power needs
to be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the legitimate power in
6 Lavoyer (2004), p. 121.
7 This was again confirmed during the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
in 2011 dealing with the current challenges of contemporary armed conflict: ‘practice has demonstrated
that many States put forward claims of inapplicability of occupation law even as they maintain effective
control over foreign territory or a part thereof, due to the reluctance to be perceived as an occupying
power’, 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, ‘International Humanitarian
Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’, Report prepared by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, October 2011, pp. 26–27 (hereafter 2011 Challenges report). See
also Benvenisti (2003), p. 860: ‘Using sophisticated claims, all occupants in the past three decades
avoided acknowledging that their presence on foreign soil was in fact an occupation subject to the Hague
Regulations or Fourth Geneva Convention […]’. Consequently, as rightly remarked by Greenwood
(2000), p. 218: ‘the law of belligerent occupation has a poor record of compliance for most of the 20th
century’.
8 See UK Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 11.4.
9 Cuyckens (2016), p. 417.
10 Debbasch (1962), p. 324. See also the Report ‘International humanitarian law and the challenges of
contemporary armed conflicts’, document prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Geneva, October 2015, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva,
Switzerland, 8–10 December 2015, p. 11 (hereafter 2015 Challenges report).
278 H. Cuyckens
123
the occupied territory.11 These two conditions furthermore imply another important
third condition, namely that the exercise of authority by the occupying power in
place of the legitimate government is done without the consent of the latter.12 If the
legitimate power effectively and validly consents to the presence of the foreign
power this would not trigger the law of occupation.
Occupation thus distinguishes itself from a mere invasion by the fact that there is
some exercise of authority over the territory concerned. As Lassa Oppenheim so
correctly stated, ‘occupation is invasion plus taking possession of enemy country for
the purpose of holding it’.13 The exact moment in which an invasion becomes an
occupation is however particularly difficult to determine. This has led some, and
admittedly this is the majority opinion, to argue that in order to guarantee the best
protection possible for the occupied population, some of the obligations of the law of
occupation should already apply during the invasion phase.14 Consequently, a
distinction is created on the basis of the nature of the right concerned given that the
rights guaranteed to individuals under the law of occupation would already apply
during the invasion phase, whereas for the other rights, such as the rules concerning
property for example, the effective territorial control test would still be required.15 I
would however like to adopt a stricter stance on this issue and clearly differentiate
between the obligations resting upon an invading party and an occupying power. A
conflation between the invasion and occupation phase is in my opinion problematic
given that it creates a distortion between fact and law. This is even more problematic
given the factual nature of the determination of occupation and the importance of the
effective control test. In addition, applying different tests to different situations on the
basis of the concerned right leads to a selective approach, and hence decreases legal
certainty and confuses the troops on the ground. Furthermore, the Fourth Geneva
Convention already foresees a general protection for both those falling in the hands of
the enemy during the invasion phase and those under occupation.16 Admittedly, this
concerns a more basic protection and one that is less developed than the protection
11 These two criteria were already clearly established in 1949: ‘Whether an invasion has developed into
an occupation is a question of fact. The term invasion implies a military operation while an occupation
indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the exclusion of the established government [emphasis
added]’; United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Case No. 47, Trial of Wilhelm List and others,
United Nations War Crimes Commission. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, 1949,
pp. 55–56 (hereafter List case). See also UK Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 355; Von Glahn (1957),
p. 28; Zwanenburg (2007), pp. 109–110; Kolb and Vite´ (2013), p. 97.
12 The importance of the absence of consent is for example confirmed by the definition of occupation
provided by Benvenisti (2012), p. 3: ‘the effective control of a power (be it one or more stated or an
international organisation such as the United Nations) over a territory to which that power has no
sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory [emphasis added]’. See also Expert
Meeting, ‘Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory’, Report prepared and
edited by T. Ferraro, Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), March 2012, p. 20
(hereafter Expert Meeting).
13 Oppenheim (1905), para. 167.
14 This position has been more commonly referred to as the Pictet Theory given that it has been
developed by Jean Pictet in the commentaries to the Fourth Geneva Convention; Pictet (1958), p. 60.
15 For an illustration of this position see for example Naletilic´ case, above n. 5, paras. 221–222.
16 See the provisions of Part III, Section 1 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions common to the territories
of the parties to the conflict and occupied territories.
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offered to civilians under occupation but the needs of these two categories are also
different. In addition, it is also not exceptional for international humanitarian law to
offer different levels of protection to different categories of protected persons.17
Finally, it also seems dangerous to impose obligations on the invader which it will
ultimately not be able to fulfil given that at least some of the obligations require the
enforcing power to have effective territorial control. Those believing that certain
obligations of the law of occupation should already apply during the invasion phase
also recognize this important limitation. They however state that the provisions are
‘flexible enough not to require what is impossible in the invasion phase’.18 In my
opinion this only further complicates the matter and makes it even more difficult to
assess which obligations of the law of occupation would exactly be applicable during
the invasion phase. I thus believe that there are specific rules applicable during the
invasion phase and that the obligations of the law of occupation only become
applicable when the effective control test has in fact been met. In my opinion there
should be no distinction based on the applicable right and hence no levelling in the
obligations during the different phases.
The effective control test has also raised the question whether the required
control needs to be actual or whether the mere potential exercise of control is
sufficient. If potential control would be deemed to be sufficient, the test would be
based on the capability of the enemy forces to exercise authority over the occupied
territory rather than on their actual exercise of such control. It would thus be
sufficient for the occupying power to have the capacity to substitute its authority for
that of the legitimate sovereign. The capacity to establish such control should,
however, not remain purely hypothetical and unfettered and it has been generally
admitted that the occupying power needs to be able to establish actual control
‘within a reasonable time’ when needed.19 There is a fundamental reason why the
potential control test should, in my opinion, be favoured. Indeed, requiring actual
rather than potential control would allow the occupying power ‘to circumvent its
obligations by simply refusing to establish the control it is in a position to
establish’.20 This would in turn generate two important gaps. First, it would create a
gap in protection.21 Putting the occupying power in a position to decide whether it
wants to activate the law of occupation or not fails to protect the civilian population
from the power it actually needs to be protected from. If the occupying power would
be considered a neutral caretaker this would not be necessary, but occupation is
rarely neutral and history has shown that the occupied population has been the
subject of major abuses.22 Second, it would also create a gap in governance.23
17 Zwanenburg (2012), p. 33.
18 Sasso`li (2012), p. 43.
19 See for example US Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 356: ‘it is sufficient that the occupying force
can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied
district’.
20 Zwanenburg (2007), p. 110.
21 Expert Meeting, above n. 12, p. 19. See also Ferraro (2012), p. 151.
22 Benvenisti (2012), p. 121.
23 Ben-Naftali (2012), p. 542.
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Occupation creates the exceptional situation in which there is a distortion between
title and control. Given that the legitimate power has been temporarily incapacitated
from exercising authority over the given territory, if the occupying power would
refuse to establish such authority in order to avoid being subjected to the obligations
incumbent upon it under the law of occupation, no authority will be exercised over
the concerned territory. It is thus also crucial for the law of occupation to be
correctly triggered in order to avoid a gap in the exercise of governmental functions
such as ensuring public order and civil life in accordance with Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations and Article 64 GCIV.
2.3 Are Boots on the Ground Necessarily Required?
Another important point to be raised in relation to the effective control test is the
question of boots on the ground. Most authors have argued that the physical
presence of hostile troops in the foreign territory is an integral part of the effective
control test.24 The prevalence of this position has been recently reconfirmed in two
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning the
Nagorno-Karabach region.25 Nuance should however be brought to this position.
Most importantly a distinction should be made between what is exactly required at
the moment of the establishment of the occupation and what is required during the
maintenance of the occupation. Indeed, if the requirement of physical presence is an
absolute necessity for the establishment of the occupation, it might, in light of the
potential control test, be less stringently needed for its maintenance.26 In my
opinion, the effective control needed to trigger occupation can indeed, in some
specific circumstances and in light of modern technological developments, be
maintained remotely, so without the (permanent) physical presence of troops.27 The
fact that there should be some leeway in interpreting the boots on the ground
requirement during the maintenance of the occupation also seems to have been
recognized by Yoram Dinstein, when he argues that ‘the Occupying Power must
deploy ‘‘boots’’ on the ground in or near the territory [emphasis added]’.28 Similar
24 Shany (2005), p. 370; Ben-Naftali (2012), p. 541; Ferraro (2012), p. 143. See also Expert Meeting,
above n. 12, p. 17 and 2015 Challenges report, above n. 10, p. 20.
25 ECtHR, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, Application no. 40167/06, 16 June 2015, para. 94 and ECtHR,
Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, Application no. 13216/06, 16 June 2015, para. 96: ‘according to
widespread expert opinion physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement of
occupation, i.e. occupation is not conceivable without ‘‘boots on the ground’’’. I would however rejoin the
criticism expressed with regard to these two judgments by M. Milanovic, ‘European Court decides that
Israel is not an occupying power in Gaza’, EJIL Talk, 17 June 2015, stating that, due to a lack of specific
international humanitarian law expertise, they might have been overstating the degree of consensus on
this point.
26 Expert Meeting, above n. 12, p. 17.
27 See also 2015 Challenges report, above n. 10, p. 12: ‘it may be argued that technological and military
developments have made it possible to assert effective control over a foreign territory (or part thereof)
without a continuous foreign military presence in the concerned area’.
28 Dinstein (2009), para. 100. Interestingly, he also argues that belligerent occupation cannot rest solely
on either naval power or air power, but he argues that Gaza is still occupied, amongst other things because
of the fact that they still control the maritime and air space.
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to the problems demonstrated in relation to the actual control test, strictly requiring
the occupying power to be physically present in the occupied territory would allow
it to easily escape the obligations otherwise imposed upon it under the law of
occupation by avoiding placing troops on the ground while nevertheless controlling
the territory concerned from the outside, amounting in fact to a situation of effective
control similar to a situation that would be sustained through troops on the ground.
Leniency in the application of the physical presence requirement seems to
furthermore correspond most with reality given that it allows two majority opinions
to be reconciled, namely (1) that physical presence is an integral part of the effective
control test, and (2) that despite the disengagement, the majority argues that Gaza is
still occupied.
2.4 End of Occupation
The theoretical answer to the question of when an occupation comes to an end is an
easy one and mirrors the conditions for triggering occupation: once the occupying
power loses effective control over the concerned territory, the occupation ends.29
The end of occupation is thus also a factual assessment. However, as is the case with
most factual assessments, this assessment is far from easy to apply in practice and
the question of the end of occupation is actually one of the most complex in
practice.
Ordinarily the occupation ends ‘when an occupant withdraws from the territory
or is driven out of it’.30 However, the occupying power rarely withdraws at once at
an exact moment in time. A withdrawal rather occurs progressively, through a
gradual thinning out of the forces concerned. Similarly, the exact moment of the
loss of effective control when hostilities are resurging is also difficult to pinpoint,
especially given that not all resurgences of hostilities will put an end to such
control.31 It is therefore difficult to assess if and when exactly the effective control
has been lost. In addition, whereas effective withdrawal indeed ends occupation, the
fact that foreign troops continue to be present on the territory concerned does not
necessarily mean that the occupation continues. This is mainly the case when the
legitimate power ends up consenting to the presence of the foreign troops. In
practice this would for example be the case when a treaty ending an occupation is
29 Benvenisti (2012), p. 56; Ferraro (2012), p. 156.
30 Oppenheim (1905), para. 168. See also UK Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 11.7.
31 In this regard the UK Military Manual informs us that: ‘the fact that some of the inhabitants are in a
state of rebellion, or that guerrillas or resistance fighters have occasional successes, does not render the
occupation at an end. Even a temporarily successful rebellion in part of the area under occupation does
not necessarily terminate the occupation so long as the occupying power takes steps to deal with the
rebellion and re-establish its authority or the area is surrounding and cut off. Whether or not a rebel
movement has successfully terminated an occupation is a question of fact and degree depending on, for
example, the extent of the area controlled by the movement and the length of time involved, the intensity
of operations, and the extent to which the movement is internationally recognized’; UK Military Manual,
above n. 5, para. 11.7.1. A similar argument is made in the US Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 360:
‘the existence of a rebellion or the activity of guerrilla or para-military units [will not] of itself cause the
occupation to cease, provided the occupant could at any time it desired assume physical control of any
part of the territory’.
282 H. Cuyckens
123
accompanied by another one allowing the foreign forces to remain.32 For consent to
effectively terminate occupation, it however needs to be genuine, valid and
explicit.33 Finally, the fact that the end of occupation is a factual assessment also
entails that merely declaring that the occupation has come to an end, while the facts
on the ground still seem to show otherwise, is not sufficient. This was one of the
main issues concerning the end of the occupation in Iraq. Indeed, whilst resolution
1546 (2004) proclaimed that by the 30th of June 2004, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) administrating the territory on behalf of the occupying powers
would cease to exist and that consequently Iraq would reassert its full sovereignty
and thus reassert authority over the previously occupied territory,34 the CPA in fact
continued to exercise effective control over the concerned territory. If the transfer of
authority would have been effective at the time stated in the resolution, then the
occupation would have ended. However, given that effective control had not in fact
been returned to the Iraqi government at that time, the mere declaration of the end of
the occupation in United Nations Security Council resolution 1546 (2004) did not in
fact end the occupation. For a transfer of authority to successfully end the
occupation, it must thus be effective.35 The idea is, of course, to avoid the
occupying forces installing puppet governments and occupations by proxy in order
to escape the occupying power’s obligations, while de facto maintaining effective
control over the territory.36
3 The Status of Gaza Post-Disengagement
Whereas until December 2006, the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank were
generally considered to be occupied in the sense of Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations, the status of Gaza after the ‘disengagement is less straightforward’.37 It
is from the outset important to recall that the debate concerns solely the Gaza Strip;
the occupied status of the West Bank has not been questioned. The specific
difference between both territories will be further outlined below.
In this part of the paper, we will apply the above-mentioned criteria for triggering
(or maintaining) occupation concerning the situation of Gaza since the disengage-
ment. We will show that whilst there is no doubt that Gaza used to be occupied, the
effective control needed for the occupation to endure is no longer present. We will
then address the so-called ‘functional approach’ which is used to argue that despite
the fact that there is no longer effective control in the strict sense, the occupation
nevertheless continues at least to a certain extent and we will show the pitfalls of
such an approach.
32 For concrete examples see Roberts (2005), p. 29.
33 Expert Meeting, above n. 12, p. 21. See also Kolb and Vite´ (2013), p. 135.
34 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1546 (2004), S/RES/1546(2004), 8 June 2004, para. 2.
35 Do¨rmann and Colassis (2004), p. 309. See also Scobbie (2006), p. 10.
36 Do¨rmann and Colassis (2004), p. 309.
37 Darcy and Reynolds (2010), p. 225.
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3.1 The Effective Control Test and the Situation of Gaza
Post-Disengagement
In accordance with its Revised Disengagement Plan of the 6th of June 2004,
Israel withdrew its land forces and evacuated its settlements from Gaza.38 The
plan also specifically foresaw that once the process of disengagement would be
completed, there would no longer be any basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip
is still occupied territory.39 We have seen, however, that a mere statement
declaring occupation to be over is not sufficient to effectively terminate the
occupation. Given the factual nature of the assessment, an objective assessment
of the facts on the ground needs to be made. We thus have to assert whether the
conditions required for the law of occupation to be triggered in fact continue to
be met.
The debate surrounding the status of Gaza post-disengagement has been framed
both in terms of the requirement for occupying troops to have boots on the ground,
i.e. being physically located in the occupied area, as well as in terms of the
continued existence or not of effective control. In my opinion, the question of boots
on the ground is not the determinative one. Indeed, as was outlined above, the
criteria of boots on the ground has to be nuanced in two ways: first, whereas it might
be a stringent criterion for establishing occupation, it is not as strictly interpreted for
the maintenance of the occupation; and second, the troops do not necessarily need to
be positioned in the territory, but could also be posted in its vicinity. It is thus above
all a question of the continued existence of effective control by the Israeli army over
the Gaza Strip.
There is little doubt that Israel continues to exercise a considerable level of
control over the Gaza Strip. Israel maintains complete control over Gaza’s
airspace40 and territorial waters,41 as well as over the crossings between it and the
Gaza Strip.42 It furthermore has a tremendous impact on the life of the Gaza Strip
through its control over the passage of commercial goods into Gaza as well as its
38 The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, 6 June 2004 (as published by the Prime
Minister’s Office) Addendum A—Revised Disengagement Plan—Main Principles, http://www.mfa.gov.
il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/MFADocuments/Pages/Revised%20Disengagement%20Plan%206-June-
2004.aspx.
39 The Disengagement Plan—General Outline, 18 April 2004 (Communicated by the Prime Minister’s
Office), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/MFADocuments/Pages/Disengagement%
20Plan%20-%20General%20Outline.aspx.
40 Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement), ‘Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility
in the Gaza Strip’, November 2011, p. 12 (hereafter Gisha Scale of Control report). See also United
Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict’, A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009 (hereafter ‘Goldstone report’) stating in para.
383: ‘[s]ince July 2007 Hamas has been the de facto government authority in Gaza’. See also, more
recently, Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant
to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1’, A/HRC/29/52, 24 June 2015, para. 17 (hereafter
Commission of Inquiry 2015 report), referring to the ‘government-like functions’ exercised by Hamas.
These findings, however, do not seem to stand in the way of these bodies arguing that Gaza is
nevertheless still under Israeli occupation.
41 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 13.
42 Ibid., p. 14.
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continued control of the Palestinian Population registry,43 controlling whom and
what goes into the Gaza Strip. The question, however, is whether the exercised
control meets the threshold necessary for triggering occupation. The fact that Israel
is not the sole authority exercising some form of authority over the Gaza Strip is, in
my opinion, problematic in this regard. Indeed, since June 2007, Hamas carries out
most of the governmental administration functions as well as being responsible for
public services such as education, policing, sanitation and hospitals.44 There is thus
at the very least a form of concurrent control between Israel and Hamas, making it,
in my opinion, very difficult to assert that Israel has the effective control required
for occupation since effective control requires the occupying power to be in a
position to substitute its own authority for that of the local authority. Even if some
form of vertical power sharing between the occupying power and the local
authorities is not necessarily an obstacle to effective control,45 there however needs
to be some hierarchical relationship between the occupying power and the said
authority, the former retaining a form of control over the latter.46 This does not seem
to be the case in the relationship between the Israeli forces and Hamas. In addition,
even if we adopt the more lenient potential control test instead of the actual control
test (the latter would in any case not be met in the case at hand), the troops still have
to be able to assert effective control over the presumably occupied territory ‘within
a reasonable time’.47 Admittedly, the timeliness element was interpreted fairly
leniently in the framework of, for example, the List case.48 However, I would argue
that in light of modern technological developments, what might have been
considered reasonable back then, is not necessarily reasonable anymore. Conse-
quently, if foreign armed forces need to engage in significant combat operations in
order to recapture the area in question from local forces, then the territory can no
longer be said to be occupied.49 In this particular case, for Israel to reassert effective
control over Gaza would require a major ground offensive and consequently it
would not be possible ‘within a reasonable time’. Relating to the fighting in
43 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, pp. 17–19.
44 Ibid., p. 23.
45 Israeli High Court of Justice, 102/82, Tsemel v. Minister of Defence, as translated into English in the
Palestine Yearbook on International Law, Vol. 1, 1984, p. 169, at p. 170: ‘If we were in a situation where
a regular military administration has been installed, the military force would be free to decide in what
measure it exercises its powers within the sphere of civil administration through its direct delegates and
what areas of civil administration should be left in the hands of the authorities of the previous regime, be
these local authorities or officials of the previous regime. […] The fact that the authorities of the earlier
regime are left to operate to some extent, does not detract from the reality of the existence of an effective
military control over the territory nor detract from the incidental consequences under the laws of war’.
46 In this regard see for example Ferraro (2012), p. 149.
47 As was shown above, this ‘reasonable’ time requirement was already found in the List case, above n.
11, p. 56: ‘While it is true that the partisans were able to control sections of these countries [i.e. Greece
and Yugoslavia] at various times, it is established that the Germans could at any time they desired assume
physical control of any part of the country’; as well as being confirmed by military manuals such as the
US Military Manual, above n. 5, para. 356 and learned authors such as for example Von Glahn (1957),
p. 29.
48 List case, above n. 11, p. 56.
49 Gasser and Do¨rmann (2013), p. 273.
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2008–2009, it was held that ‘[s]hould Israel wish to reintroduce its control over
Gaza, it would face fierce military resistance and it would have to engage in very
intensive and bloody military action’.50 That intensive military action would be
required to reassert effective control was again confirmed during the summer of
2014 by the magnitude of the Israeli operation ‘Protective Edge’. Indeed, over the
four weeks that the operation lasted, an estimated of 2251 Palestinians were killed
and 11,231 were injured, 67 Israeli soldiers were killed and 1600 were injured, and
the destruction of civilian infrastructure was tremendous.51 Given that Israel is no
longer in a position to assert effective control on the Gaza Strip ‘within a reasonable
time’, the definition of occupation is no longer met and consequently the Gaza Strip
is no longer occupied by Israel.52
This position was also confirmed by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Al-
Bassiouini case concerning the reduction of the amount of fuel allowed into the
Gaza Strip, when it held that:
since September 2005 Israel no longer had effective control over what
happens in the Gaza strip. Military rule that applied in the past in this territory
came to an end by a decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are no
longer stationed in the territory on a permanent basis, nor are they in charge of
what happen there. In these circumstances, the State of Israel does not have a
general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza strip or to
maintain public order in the Gaza strip according to the laws of belligerent
occupation in international law. Nor does Israel have any effective capability,
in its present position, of enforcing order and managing civilian life in the
Gaza strip.53
The difference between the situation of the Gaza Strip and the situation of the
West Bank is specifically to be found in the two above-mentioned elements: (1) who
has the ultimate authority over the area in question; and (2) can the authority be
reasserted ‘within a reasonable time’. First, whereas in the West Bank as well there
has been some transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority, the main difference
is that the Palestinian Authority, contrary to Hamas, remains formally subjected to
the Israeli Authority.54 Indeed, as was established above, a vertical sharing of
responsibilities does not necessarily affect the effective control of the occupying
power as long as there remains a hierarchical relationship between the occupying
power and the local authority, the former retaining a form of control over the latter.
Second, contrary to the situation in Gaza, there is no doubt that the Israeli Defence
forces (IDF) are at all times capable of reasserting control over the West Bank, even
with regard to Area A, which is normally under exclusive Palestinian control.
50 Bell and Shefi (2010), p. 274.
51 Commission of Inquiry 2015 report, above n. 40, paras. 21–23.
52 A similar position is adopted, amongst others, by Shany (2009), p. 105; Benvenisti (2012), p. 212; and
Rostow (2007), p. 217.
53 Israeli High Court of Justice, Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed and Others v. Prime Ministers and Minister of
defence, Case no. 9132/07, 27 January 2008, para. 12 (hereafter the Al-Bassiouni case).
54 Bell and Shefi (2010), p. 274.
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3.2 The Functional Approach to the Situation in Gaza
Opinions remain strongly divided, however, on the question of the exact status of
Gaza and numerous authors,55 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)56 and
international organizations57 argue that the Gaza Strip is nevertheless still occupied.
Different arguments are put forward in support of the position that Israel is still an
occupying power in Gaza. First, there are those advocating that the Gaza Strip is
still under Israeli occupation by arguing that the control exercised by Israel over the
Strip does still meet the threshold for occupation.58 This position will not be further
analysed here because it quickly becomes a yes/no debate on whether the control
still exercised over the Strip by Israel indeed fulfils the effective control threshold or
not. Furthermore, my opinion on this point has already been clearly outlined above
(see supra Sect. 3.1). Second, some use the what could be referred to as the
indivisible argument, arguing that the West Bank and Gaza should be seen as a
single territorial entity and hence the occupation should be assessed as a whole.59
Given that the occupied status of the West Bank is not contested, the entire
Palestinian Territories, including Gaza, would still be occupied. This argument will
also not be further assessed given that such an argument contradicts the very text of
the law itself. Indeed, both the clear reference to the possibility of a partial
occupation of a territory in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions and the
maxim that ‘occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised’ in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations make it
clear that occupation can also be effected on only part of a territory.60 Third, there is
the so-called functional approach to occupation. Given that the ICRC recently
seems to have voiced its support for this position,61 the core of this section is going
to be concerned with this approach.
55 Mari (2005), pp. 356–368; Dinstein (2009), paras. 664–673; Scobbie (2006) pp. 3–31; Aronson (2005),
pp. 49–63.
56 This is the case, for example, for Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2014/15 to the
State of Israel, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-
and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/ (accessed 12 July
2016); See also Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 12.
57 This is the leading position within the United Nations; see for example Goldstone report, above n. 40,
para. 276; as well as of the European Union (EU); see EU Heads of Missions’ Report on Gaza, 2013
available at http://www.eccpalestine.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/HoM-report-on-GAZA.pdf (ac-
cessed 12 July 2016). This is also the position of the ICRC, see Maurer (2012), p. 1506 and 2015
Challenges report, above n. 10, p. 12.
58 See for example Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur John Dugard on the
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, A/HRC/7/17, 21 January
2008, para. 11, and Goldstone report, above n. 40, para. 278. See also Dinstein (2009), para. 668; Mari
(2005), p. 366; and Aronson (2005), p. 51.
59 See for example Dinstein (2009), para. 666.
60 Even if it is also clear that applying a different ‘status’ to Gaza and the West Bank further complicates
the matter is practice, there is nothing in the law of occupation stating that the occupation of part of a
territory means the occupation of the entirety of that territory.
61 See 2015 Challenges report, above n. 10, p. 12.
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The functional approach can be described as some kind of midway approach.
In contrast to those merely arguing that in light of the scope and degree of
control still being exercised by it, Israel continues to be an occupying power in
Gaza, those advocating in favour of the functional approach recognize that Israel
no longer has overall effective control over the Gaza Strip. They however also
state that given that effective control has, in their opinion, been maintained over
some areas, the law of occupation should continue to be applied to those areas
that still remain under Israeli control.62 The idea behind this theory is to allow
the specific protection offered by the law of occupation to people under the
control of a foreign power to endure in a complex situation such as the one of
the Gaza Strip.63 It recognizes that occupation does not always end at one point
in time but that control can be relinquished in a gradual manner. Adopting a
functional approach in such situations would then be necessary in order to avoid
a legal vacuum.64 In other words, as long as Israel continues to exercise some
control over the Gaza Strip and Palestinian sovereignty has not yet been fully
realized, it is in the opinion of those advocating this theory that it is not possible
to argue that the occupation has ended.65 There is thus some levelling in the
obligations based on the exercised control: the obligations rooted in the law of
occupation continue to apply to those areas still deemed to be under effective
control whereas they no longer apply to those areas over which effective control
has been relinquished.66 Consequently, the nature and extent of the obligations
will depend on the level of control exercised over the concerned area and
whether it reaches the effective control threshold needed to trigger the law of
occupation or not.
The functional approach seems to have been endorsed by the ICRC in its most
recent report on the challenges of contemporary armed conflict to international
humanitarian law:
In principle, the effective control test is equally applicable when establishing
the end of occupation, meaning that the criteria to be met should generally
mirror those used to determining the beginning of occupation, only in reverse
[…]. The ICRC considers however, that in some specific and rather
exceptional cases—in particular when foreign forces withdraw from occupied
territory (or parts thereof) but retain key elements of authority or other
important governmental functions usually performed by an occupying
power—the law of occupation may continue to apply within the territorial
and functional limits of such competences. Indeed, despite of the lack of
physical presence of foreign forces in the territory concerned, the retained
authority may amount to effective control for the purposes of the law of
62 Gross (2012). This position has been largely taken in the Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40.
63 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 26.
64 Ferraro (2012), p. 157.
65 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 40.
66 Ibid., p. 26.
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occupation and entail the continued application of the relevant provisions of
this body of norms.67
The exceptional situation referred to in this paragraph is undoubtedly the
situation in the Gaza Strip.
I fully agree with the fact that the law of occupation drafted at the beginning of
the 20th century might not be completely adequate to deal with some contemporary
features of occupation,68 and that, furthermore, the situation of Gaza constitutes a
complex case. This does not however mean that the concept should be overstretched
in order to address these new and rather exceptional features. To this extent two
main issues may be raised. Firstly, is it possible to apply the effective control test in
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations in a way that it would be met for certain areas
and not for others? Secondly, even if we were to accept such a possibility, how
would that assessment be made and which obligations would apply to which areas
of control?
One of the main issues in relation to the functional approach is the question of
whether the determination of a situation of occupation is a binary question, meaning
that either there is occupation or not, or whether there can indeed be some kind of
de´doublement fonctionnel, implying a differentiated approach based on a differen-
tiation depending on the level of control exercised over a particular area. When
looking at Article 42 of the Hague Regulations containing the test used to trigger the
application of the law of occupation, it seems clear that it is related to a test of
effective territorial control. In other words, for the law of occupation to be
triggered, a foreign force needs to be in effective control of a territory or parts
thereof. Nowhere is it mentioned that exercising some control over certain areas in
the non-territorial sense of the word would trigger occupation. Similarly, taking the
full realization of Palestinian sovereignty into account in order to establish whether
the obligations under the law of occupation have effectively ended is also not part of
that test. To put it simply, either the effective territorial control test contained in
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations is met and the law of occupation is activated or
it is not. As was already demonstrated above, this is no longer the case with regard
to the Gaza Strip, mainly because Israel is no longer in a position to effectively
assert authority over the Gaza Strip within a reasonable time (see supra Sect. 3.1).
Additionally, it has been argued, and to my opinion rightfully, that there is a close
link between Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations establishing the
obligation for the occupying power to restore and ensure public order and civil
life.69 If the foreign power would not be in a position to exercise this key obligation
under the law of occupation it would make little sense to make some of the other
obligations arising from the law of occupation applicable to it simply because they
would be very difficult to fulfil.70
67 2015 Challenges report, above n. 10, p. 12.
68 For an in-depth analysis of the question whether the law of occupation is still suitable for dealing with
contemporary situations as well as a determination of ways in which to address the challenges raised by
the potential gaps between the law and reality, see Cuyckens (2015).
69 See, for example, Shany (2009), p. 106.
70 Ibid., p. 106.
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Concerning the second issue, even if we were to admit that a binary view of the
law of occupation would be outdated, a certain number of practical issues would
arise in relation to the functional approach. When would we consider the effective
control test established under Article 42 to be met regarding an area that does not
have a territorial component? And even if we would be able to make such an
assessment, which specific rules of the law of occupation would be applicable to
which areas and to what extent would these obligations apply? As Valentina Azarov
so rightfully summarized:
the fragmentation of the law of occupation, through the application of
different sets of obligations at different points in time would turn the law from
a ‘set menu’, intended to restrain and control the occupier, into dishes at a
buffet from which the occupier can pick and choose as it likes.71
Such a pick and choose approach would entrust the occupying power itself with
determining the extent of its own obligations and instead of enhancing protection
even further, it would enhance the risk of abusive behaviour. There is thus a strong
case to be made for the view that, in the end, a binary application of the law would
foster more protection, since making all the obligations applicable would be more
stringent for the occupation than a functional approach.72
In order to justify the legitimacy of the differentiating approach advocated by the
functional approach, reference is made to the fact that such an approach also exists
with regard to the transition from the invasion phase to the occupation phase (see
supra Sect. 2.2).73 I have already voiced my opinion against this theory earlier on in
this paper and limitations similar to the ones I raised in this regard would also be
applicable here.
To conclude, the functional approach should in my opinion not be withheld for
two main reasons. Firstly, it overrules the effective territorial control test contained
in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations and thereby overstretches the application of
the law of occupation. Modifying the fundaments of an entire system in order to
make it applicable to the sui generis exceptional situation of the Gaza Strip would
create the risk of eroding the system altogether. Secondly, even if we were to accept
such a deviating approach, establishing obligations commensurate with the level of
control is also far from enhancing legal certainty and might even lead to more
abuses in the end.
4 Alternative Grounds for Responsibility vis-a`-vis Gaza and Its
Inhabitants?
The complexity and the heated nature of the debate surrounding the status of Gaza
is, in my opinion, mainly fuelled by the fact that Israel continues to exercise






same time it is difficult to maintain that it is still an occupying power, at least in the
strict sense. Concomitantly, there seems to be a need for this complex reality to be
translated into obligations of some sort, be it under the law of occupation or
otherwise.74
According to the Israeli Supreme Court in the Al-Bassiouini judgement, the
residual obligations of Israel towards the Gaza Strip are based on the following three
grounds: (1) the armed conflict that is still ongoing between Israel and Hamas75; (2)
the control Israel still exercises over the border crossings; and (3) the importance of
the relationship created between Israel and Hamas over the years. The first ground is
relatively straightforward: due to the fact that there is still an armed conflict between
Israel and Hamas, the relevant obligations under general international humanitarian
law continue to apply. The two other grounds are more controversial, especially
since there is no further detail provided by the Israeli Supreme Court in relation to
these grounds. It is especially unclear what the legal obligations generated by these
two others grounds would be, if any at all to start with.
The third option hinted at by the Israeli Supreme Court refers to what could be
qualified as post-occupation obligations. These obligations mainly refer to the fact
that given the length of the Israeli occupation a long-term relationship has been
created between the occupier and the occupied territory and population. This
ultimately resulted in a high level of dependency of the latter on the former in some
areas, such as, for example, the provision of electricity as illustrated by the above-
mentioned Al-Bassiouini case. Whereas the need for such a transitory regime seems
quite forthright, especially in the case of long-term occupation, it is not very clear
from which legal source such obligations would emanate. Even more so since long-
term occupation is quite a recent phenomenon and is one that was not taken into
account when the law of occupation was drafted. Different authors have explored
this possibility of such post-occupation obligations. Importantly they all agree that
these will not find their source in the law of occupation given that the precise ambit
of these obligations would be to regulate the transition phase, once the occupation
has come to an end and the law of occupation is thus no longer formally
applicable.76 Interestingly, the need for such obligations has been raised by both
those arguing that there is no longer any occupation and those adopting the
functional approach. In the framework of the latter view, the post-obligations will be
applicable to those areas over which the effective control has been relinquished,
whereas the law of occupation will continue to apply to those areas still under
effective control.77 Everyone also seems to agree, however, that there are not yet
any clear post-occupation obligations founded in positive international law.78
74 For a more detailed account of the reasons behind this debate see Shany (2008), pp. 68–86.
75 In relation with the problem of electricity and fuel levels raised in Al-Bassiouni, above n. 53, the
adequate obligation under international humanitarian law would be Art. 23 GCIV even though this might
not be entirely satisfactory since this article, as we have seen above, only warrants the free passage of
humanitarian goods and does not lead to an obligation to ensure a certain level of supply as Art. 55 GCIV
would in situations of occupation.
76 Ronen (2014), p. 431. See also Rubin (2010), p. 553.
77 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 48.
78 Rubin (2010), p. 554.
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Interestingly, the Court also makes no clear reference to potential human
rights obligations. In my opinion, the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations would nevertheless provide the best option to characterize the level
of control falling short of occupation exercised over Gaza. Indeed the degree of
control required to fulfil the effective control test needed to trigger the
extraterritorial application of international human rights obligations is lower than
the one needed for occupation. It can thus be that the amount of control falls
short of occupation but nevertheless triggers the extraterritorial application of
international human rights law.79 I tend to agree with Yuval Shany that
‘international human rights law may serve as the ‘‘missing link’’ between
Israel’s de facto power over Gaza […] and the obligation to provide basic
supplies to Gaza’.80 The application of human rights obligations would actually
fit the exercise quite well given that they constitute obligations levelled to the
amount of control over people or territory.81 The question is whether we could
argue that the territory and/or the population of Gaza fall within the
(extraterritorial) jurisdiction of Israel. Choosing the extraterritorial application
of the human rights law path is indeed also not without difficulties. The
difficulty lies more particularly in the fact that there is no clear-cut situation of
extraterritoriality here, given that Israel operates from its own territory and
hence not extraterritorially. The extraterritorial element is not founded on its
presence on foreign ground but is based on the fact that conduct emanating from
the territory of Israel has extraterritorial effects.82 This does not correspond to
the classical models of extraterritorial jurisdiction.83 An attempt could however
be made to argue that there is some personal jurisdiction over the people of
Gaza due to the fact that the Israeli actions have great repercussions on
important areas of daily life but this would most probably mean an extensive
interpretation of the personal model of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is
interesting in this regard to look at the ‘effects doctrine’ developed by Yuval
Shany: if action by the Israeli authorities has direct, substantial and foreseeable
effects upon or in the territory of Gaza, the relevant human rights obligations
would be applicable to those actions.84 This could be argued to be the case
regarding control over the borders, the population registry and the tax system.85
Concretely this would for example entail that the Israeli authorities would have
to respect the freedom of movement as enshrined in Article 12 of the ICCPR
79 Ronen (2014), p. 429.
80 Shany (2009), p. 110. See also, Lubell (2011), p. 250 in which he states that the fact that Gaza would
no longer be occupied would not necessarily release Israel from its obligations towards the population, for
example under certain theories of human rights obligations.
81 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 59.
82 However, according to Kleffner (2010), p. 69 several human rights bodies do seem to have recognized
that human rights obligations also extend to measures within a State’s territory that have extraterritorial
effect.
83 For a further analysis of these two models see Milanovic (2011), pp. 118–228.
84 Shany (2009), p. 113.
85 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 61. Shany (2009), p. 114 also refers to the area of border
control for the potential successful application of this theory.
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with regard to the control exercised over the passage of people and more
generally the rules relating to economic rights when dealing with the passage of
goods.86 Similarly, they would, for example, also have to respect the right to
family life (Article 17 ICCPR) when taking decisions relating to the adminis-
tration of the population registry.87 It is in any case important to mention that
these human rights obligations would exist alongside the obligations under
general international humanitarian law. Indeed, it has been generally admitted
that ‘both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive’.88
Imposing human rights obligations on Israel vis-a`-vis the population of Gaza
would however also be very difficult to realize in practice since Israel does not
recognize even the ‘regular’ extraterritorial application of human rights
obligation, nor even the continued application of human rights law during
armed conflict.89
5 Conclusion
Given that there is no longer any effective control in the sense of Article 42 of the
Hague Regulations, it is difficult to sustain that Gaza is still occupied. The difficulty
surrounding the situation of Gaza is that Israel continues to exercise an important
level of control over the Gaza Strip and its population, making it difficult to accept
that it would no longer have any obligations with regard to the Strip. Whereas it is
clear that some international humanitarian law obligations still exist based on the
ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Hamas, the situation seems to require an
additional form of obligations, even if it is not quite clear where these obligations
would stem from.
In the absence of specific post-occupation obligations that might be needed in
order to address the aftermath of long-term occupation, human rights law seems to
be the best possible answer to some of the gaps needed to be filled in such cases.
Or, alternatively, we might just have to accept that at the present stage of the
development of international law, there are not yet any international obligations
which are sufficiently capable of addressing a situation like the one raised by the
situation of Gaza. In my view, it is in any case not a solution to bend the law in
order to make obligations applicable when they are no longer to be formally
applied.
86 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 61. Israel has ratified both the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
rights (ICESCR).
87 Gisha Scale of Control report, above n. 40, p. 61.
88 See for example International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31:
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/REV.1/
add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 11.
89 Gill (2013), p. 255.
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